Intra firm bargaining and shapley values by Brügemann, Björn et al.
VU Research Portal
Intra firm bargaining and shapley values
Brügemann, Björn; Gautier, Pieter; Menzio, Guido
published in
Review of Economic Studies
2019
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1093/restud/rdy015
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Brügemann, B., Gautier, P., & Menzio, G. (2019). Intra firm bargaining and shapley values. Review of Economic
Studies, 86(2), 564-592. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy015
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
[11:28 2/2/2019 OP-REST180030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 564 564–592
Review of Economic Studies (2019) 86, 564–592 doi:10.1093/restud/rdy015
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Advance access publication 5 February 2018








University of Pennsylvania, NBER and Dale T. Mortensen Centre
First version received August 2015; Editorial decision January 2018; Accepted January 2018 (Eds.)
We study two wage bargaining games between a firm and multiple workers. We revisit the bargaining
game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel. We show that, in the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the gains
from trade captured by workers who bargain earlier with the firm are larger than those captured by workers
who bargain later, as well as larger than those captured by the firm. The resulting equilibrium payoffs are
different from those reported in Stole and Zwiebel as they are not the Shapley values. We propose a novel
bargaining game, the Rolodex game, which follows a simple and realistic protocol. In the unique no-delay
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game, the payoffs to the firm and to the workers are their Shapley
values.
Key words: Intra firm bargaining, Shapley value.
JEL Codes: D21, J30
1. INTRODUCTION
We revisit the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple employees. The standard
axiomatic approach to this type of multilateral bargaining problem is provided by Shapley (1953),
who shows that there exists a unique solution satisfying certain desirable properties. The classic
game-theoretic approach to the bargaining problem between a firm and multiple employees is
provided by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), who obtain three results. First, they propose a notion of
stability and characterize the stable bargaining outcome (Theorem 1). Second, they advance an
extensive-form game which they claim to implement the stable bargaining outcome in the unique
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (Theorem 2). Finally, they show that workers’ wages and the firm’s
profit in the stable outcome coincide with the Shapley values (Theorem 4). Stole and Zwiebel
(1996b) analyse the implications of their bargaining outcome for a wide variety of substantive
issues related to the technology choice and organizational design of the firm. Since then, the
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Stole and Zwiebel bargaining outcome has been applied widely in search-theoretic models of the
labour market.1
In this paper, we analyse two perfect-information bargaining games between a firm and
multiple employees. First, we re-examine the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel. We
solve for the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game. We characterize the equilibrium
payoffs accruing to firm and workers and show that they are different from those reported in
Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and, hence, they are different from the Shapley values and from the
stable bargaining outcome. Second, we propose a novel bargaining game between a firm and
multiple workers that follows a simple and realistic protocol and delivers the Shapley values in
the unique no-delay Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We refer to this game as the “Rolodex game”,
after the rotating file device used to store business contact information.
In the first part of the article, we characterize the solution to the Stole and Zwiebel game
(henceforth, the SZ game). The game includes a firm and n workers, who are placed in some
arbitrary queue. The game proceeds as a finite sequence of pairwise bargaining sessions between
the firm and one of the workers. Each bargaining session follows the same protocol as in
Binmore et al. (1986, henceforth the BRW game), i.e. the worker and the firm alternate in making
proposals about the worker’s wage and, after every rejection, there is some probability of a
breakdown. Each bargaining session ends either with an agreement over some wage or with
a breakdown. In case of agreement, the firm enters a bargaining session with the next worker
in the queue. In case of breakdown, the worker exits the game and the whole bargaining
process starts over with one less worker. When the firm reaches an agreement with all the
workers who are left in the game, the agreed-upon wages are paid out and production takes
place.
We prove that the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the SZ game is such that the
firm reaches an agreement with every worker without delay. The gains from trade (and, hence, the
wages) captured by a worker are decreasing with the worker’s position in the queue, i.e. the first
worker captures more gains from trade than the second worker, who captures more gains from
trade than the third, etc… The gains from trade captured by the firm are equal to those captured
by the last worker. The relevant notion of gains from trade is given by the output produced by the
firm and n workers net of the sum of the payoffs that each of the n workers would obtain if he
were excluded from the game and the payoff that the firm would obtain if it were to bargain with
n−1 rather than n workers. We show that the equilibrium payoffs to the workers imply intra-firm
wage inequality. We show that the equilibrium payoff to the firm implies that the firm has an
incentive to hire more workers than it would if it were to take the wage as given.
The structure of the equilibrium payoffs of the SZ game is easy to explain. In the bargaining
session between the firm and the last worker, the wage transfers utility from the firm to the worker
at a rate of 1 to 1. That is, if the last worker gets paid an extra dollar, the worker’s payoff increases
by a dollar and the firm’s payoff falls by a dollar. When the wage transfers utility at the rate
of 1 to 1, the outcome of the BRW bargaining session is a wage that equates the gains from
trade accruing to the worker and the firm. In the bargaining session between the firm and the i-th
worker in the queue, with i<n, the wage transfers utility from the firm to the worker at a rate
of less-than-1 to 1. Indeed, if the i-th worker gets paid an extra dollar, the firm’s profit falls by
less than a dollar because the firm will end up paying a lower wage to the subsequent workers.
When the wage transfers utility at a rate of less-than-1 to 1, the outcome of the BRW bargaining
session is a wage such that the gains from trade accruing to the worker exceed those accruing to
the firm. And the further ahead in the queue is the worker, the lower is the firm’s marginal cost
1. See, e.g., Cahuc et al. (2008), Ebell and Haefke (2009), Helpman et al. (2010), Elsby and Michaels (2013),
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of increasing the worker’s wage, the higher is the rate at which the wage transfers utility from
the firm to the worker and, ultimately, the higher are the worker’s gains from trade relative to the
firm’s.
The equilibrium payoffs of the SZ game are not the Shapley values. The Shapley values are
such that the firm and every worker capture the same share of the gains from trade, where the
gains from trade are defined as the output produced by the firm with n workers net of the sum
of the workers’ payoffs if they were excluded from production and the firm’s Shapley value with
n−1 rather than n workers. Therefore, while the equilibrium payoffs of the SZ game have the
same structure as the Shapley values—as they can be represented as shares of the same notion
of gains from trade—they are different from the Shapley values—as the shares of the gains from
trade accruing to the various players are different. In particular, the shares accruing to workers at
the head of the queue are higher than in the Shapley values, while the shares accruing to workers
at the end of the queue and to the firm are lower.
In the second part of the article, we study the Rolodex game, a novel extensive-form game
between a firm and multiple workers. The Rolodex game follows the same protocol as the SZ
game, with one modification. In the Rolodex game, when a worker rejects a counteroffer from
the firm, he moves to the end of the queue and the firm enters a bargaining session with the
worker who, among those without agreement, is now at the top of the queue. In contrast, in the
SZ game, a bargaining session between a firm and a worker continues until it reaches either an
agreement or a breakdown. All other aspects of the Rolodex game are the same as in the SZ game.
In particular, in the Rolodex game as in the SZ game, a breakdown in negotiations between the
firm and a worker causes the worker to exit the game and the firm to restart the entire bargaining
process with one less worker. We refer to this game as the Rolodex game because the firm cycles
through the workers without agreement, rather than bargaining with one of them until it reaches
an agreement or a breakdown.
We prove that there exists a unique no-delay SPE of the Rolodex game. In this equilibrium, the
firm and every worker—irrespective of his position in the initial queue—capture an equal share
of the gains from trade. The notion of gains from trade is the output produced by the firm with n
workers net of the sum of the workers’ payoffs if they were to be excluded from the game and the
payoff of the firm if it were to bargain with n−1 rather than n workers. Since the notion of gains
from trade and the share of the gains from trade accruing to firm and workers are the same in the
Rolodex game as in the Shapley values, the equilibrium payoffs of the Rolodex game coincide
with the Shapley values. The equilibrium payoffs to the workers in the Rolodex game imply no
intra-firm wage inequality. The equilibrium payoff to the firm in the Rolodex game implies that
the firm has an incentive to hire more workers than it would if it were to take the wage as given,
but fewer than if wages were determined according to the SZ game.
It is easy to understand why the equilibrium payoffs of the Rolodex game coincide with the
Shapley values. In the bargaining session between the firm and the last worker in the queue,
the wage transfers utility from the firm to the worker at the rate of 1 to 1. Given this rate of
transformation, the outcome of the bargaining session is a wage that equates the gains from trade
captured by the firm and the last worker. In the bargaining session between the firm and the
i-th worker in the queue, with i<n, the wage transfers utility from the firm to the worker at a
rate of less-than-1 to 1. However, the i-th worker cannot take advantage of this higher rate of
transformation. This is because, if the i-th worker rejects a counteroffer from the firm, he becomes
the last worker in the queue. Thus, the firm can successfully offer to the i-th worker the same wage
that is earned by the last worker and, in turn, the i-th worker can only successfully demand the
same wage that is earned by the last worker. Overall, the firm and every worker capture an equal
share of the gains from trade, as per the Shapley values. Moreover, the notion of gains from trade
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firm and a worker, the worker exits the game and the firm restarts the whole bargaining process
with n−1 rather than n workers.
The article is a contribution to the literature on wage bargaining between a firm and multiple
employees. The first part of the article is devoted to revisiting the SZ game. The analysis of
this game is of natural interest given its sensible protocol and its widespread application in the
labour-search literature. We find that the unique SPE of the game is such that workers are paid
different wages depending on the order in which they bargain with the firm. We relate this finding
to the empirical literature on intra-firm wage inequality and the return to seniority. We find that,
given this wage setting game, the firm has an incentive to hire more workers than it would in
a competitive labour market, as well as more workers than it would if wages were given by
the Shapley values. These findings are novel because the equilibrium payoffs to the firm and to
the workers are not those reported in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). In particular, the equilibrium
payoffs of the SZ game are different from the Shapley values, while the equilibrium payoffs
reported in Theorem 2 of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) are the Shapley values. The mistake in the
proof of Theorem 2 of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) is to argue that the outcome of the bargaining
session between the firm and a worker is always such that the gains from trade accruing to the
two parties are equalized. However, this is only true for the bargaining session between the firm
and the last worker in the queue. As Theorems 1 and 4 of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) are correct
though, they should still be credited for providing a stability-based foundation to the Shapley
values.
The second part of the article is devoted to the analysis of the Rolodex game. As the SZ game,
the Rolodex game is a generalization of BRW to an environment in which the firm bargains with
multiple workers. As the SZ game, the Rolodex game features a protocol that is plausible in the
context of wage negotiations between a firm and its employees, in the sense that the firm is involved
in every negotiation and workers are involved only in negotiations regarding their own wage. In
contrast to the SZ game, the players’ payoffs in the unique no-delay SPE of the Rolodex game
are the Shapley values. The Rolodex game contributes to the theoretical literature on bargaining
by identifying a novel protocol that yields the Shapley values in the context of a wage bargain
in a multi-worker firm. In follow-up work (Brügemann et al., 2017), we show that the Rolodex
game also yields the Myerson–Shapley values in more general contexts. The similarity between
the Rolodex and the SZ game reveals that Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) had the right insight about
some of the aspects of the type of extensive-form game that would yield the Myerson–Shapley
values. The Rolodex game also contributes to the applied literature on search-theoretic models
of the labour market. In fact, the Rolodex game is a game with a simple, perfect-information
and plausible protocol which may be referred to by the labour-search literature as a justification
for using the Shapley values as the outcome of the wage bargain between a firm and multiple
employees.2
The SZ game does not yield the Shapley values because workers who bargain earlier with the
firm are in a superior strategic position relative to workers who bargain later, as they understand
that the marginal cost to the firm from giving them a higher wage is lower. The protocol of
the Rolodex game makes it impossible for workers who bargain earlier to exploit their strategic
2. There are other perfect-information games that deliver the Shapley values. Two important games are those
developed by Gul (1989) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). However, the protocol of these games does not provide a
plausible description of wage negotiations in a multi-worker firm. In the context of a wage negotiation between a firm and
its workers, the protocol of the game by Gul features situations in which a worker buys labour from a coworker and then
sells it to the firm, as well as situations in which a worker buys the assets of the firm and then hires additional workers.
Similarly, in the context of a wage bargain in a multi-worker firm, the protocol of the game by Hart and Mas-Colell
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position because, upon rejecting an offer from the firm, they are automatically moved to the end of
the queue. Another way to prevent workers at the head of the queue from exploiting their strategic
position is to assume that the outcome of their bargain is not observed by other workers. This idea
is formalized by De Fontenay and Gans (2014). They study a game between agents in a network.
Agents bargain bilaterally with each of the agents with whom they are linked following the same
protocol as in BRW. The game is one of imperfect information as the history of a bargaining
session is privately observed by the two parties involved in it. Under some assumptions about
off-equilibrium beliefs (i.e. passive beliefs), the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the de
Fontenay and Gans game is such that the agents’ payoffs are equal to their Myerson–Shapley
values. A special case of the game is a private-information version of the SZ game. Therefore,
under imperfect information and passive beliefs, the equilibrium payoffs of the SZ game coincide
with the Shapley values.
2. THE STOLE AND ZWIEBEL GAME
In this section, we study the bargaining game between a firm and multiple workers proposed
by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). In Section 2.1, we describe the extensive form of the SZ game.
In Section 2.2, we characterize the unique SPE of the SZ game. We find that, in equilibrium, the
gains from trade captured by a worker are decreasing in the order in which he bargains with the
firm, and that the last worker in the order captures the same gains from trade as the firm does.
In Section 2.3, we show that the equilibrium payoffs to the workers and to the firm are different
from the Shapley values. We also discuss substantive implications of the solution to the SZ game,
such as intra-firm wage inequality and over-hiring.
2.1. Environment and preliminaries
We begin by describing the extensive form of the SZ game. The players in the game are a firm
and n≥1 workers. If the firm employs j≥0 of the n workers and pays them wages w1, w2, ... wj, it
attains a payoff of F( j)−w1 −w2 − ...wj, where F( j) denotes the value of the output produced by
the firm and j employees. We assume that F( j) is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave in j, i.e. F( j)<F( j+1) and F( j+1)−F( j)>F( j+2)−F( j+1) for j=0,1,2... Workers
are ex-ante identical. If a worker is hired at the wage w, he attains a payoff of w. If the worker
is not hired, he attains a payoff of w≥0, where w might represent the value that the worker can
obtain from some other firm or the value of unemployment.
The game consists of a finite sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions between the firm
and one of the workers. Workers are placed in some arbitrary order from 1 to n. The game
starts with a bargaining session between the firm and the first worker in the order. A bargaining
session involves the determination of the worker’s wage and ends either with an agreement over
a particular wage or with a breakdown. If the session ends with an agreement, the firm enters a
bargaining session with the worker who, among those still in the game, is next in the order. If
the session ends with a breakdown, the worker permanently exits the game and the entire bargain
process starts over. That is, all prior agreements between firm and workers are erased and the
firm enters a bargaining session with the worker who, among those still in the game, is first in
the order. The game ends when the firm has reached an agreement with all the workers still in
the game. When the game ends, production takes place and the firm pays the agreed-upon wages.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of the bargaining sessions in the SZ game, where the number in
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Figure 1
Sequence of bargaining sessions in SZ game
Each bargaining session between the firm and a worker follows the alternating-offer protocol
of BRW. The session starts with the worker making a wage offer to the firm. If the firm accepts
the offer, the session ends and the firm starts bargaining with the next worker. If the firm rejects
the offer, the negotiation breaks down with probability q and continues with probability 1−q,
with q∈ (0,1). If the negotiation continues, the firm makes a counteroffer to the worker. If the
worker accepts the counteroffer, the bargaining session comes to an end. If the worker rejects
the counteroffer, the negotiation breaks down with probability q and continues with probability
1−q. As long as the session continues, the worker and the firm take turns in making offers while
facing a probability q of breakdown after every rejection.
The SZ game is a natural generalization of the BRW bargaining game to an environment
in which the firm is connected to multiple workers. The firm negotiates sequentially with each
individual worker over that worker’s wage. The negotiation between the firm and a worker follows
the same protocol as in BRW. The game ends when the firm reaches an agreement with all the
workers who, at that point in time, are still connected to the firm. The game starts over whenever
a negotiation breaks down and the firm and the worker lose contact. The assumption is meant
to capture the idea that—when the connection between the firm and a worker breaks down—the
physical environment of the game changes and, for this reason, all prior agreements are annulled.
The SZ game seems like a plausible description of the bargaining process between a firm and its
workforce.
As in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), we shall focus on SPE in the limit for q→0. Before
embarking on the characterization of the equilibrium of the SZ game, it is useful to remind
our readers of the solution of the BRW bargaining game between a firm and a worker in
which the worker’s marginal benefit of a higher wage is 1, the firm’s marginal cost of a higher
wage is 1−β, and, thus, the wage transfers utility from the firm to the worker at the rate of
1−β to 1.
Lemma 1. Consider the BRW alternating-offer game between a firm and a worker. If the firm
and the worker reach an agreement at the wage w, the payoff to the worker is w and the payoff to
the firm is y−w−t(w), where t(w) is a linear function of w with derivative −β, β ∈[0,1). If the
firm and the worker do not reach an agreement, the payoff to the worker is w and the payoff to
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an agreement. (2) If y−z−w−t(w)≥0, the unique SPE3 is such that the firm and the worker





Proof. The result follows immediately from Proposition 4.2 in Muthoo (1999). ‖
In the BRW game described in Lemma 1, the gains from trade are y−z−w−t(w). The lemma
states that, if the gains from trade are negative, any SPE is such that the firm and the worker do
not reach an agreement. If the gains from trade are positive, the unique SPE is such that trade
takes place without delay at the wage (1). In this case, the gains from trade accruing to the worker,









Two features of the equilibrium of the BRW game are worth pointing out. First, in the limit as
the breakdown probability q goes to zero, the equilibrium wage and payoffs converge to the wage






This is the wage that maximizes the Nash product (w−w)·(y−z−w−t(w)). As the equilibrium
wage converges to the wage that maximizes the Nash product, it follows that the equilibrium
payoffs to firm and to worker converge to the payoffs under axiomatic Nash bargaining. This is
a well-known result. We wished to restate it because it implies that our characterization of the
SZ game would be the same if we replaced the BRW alternating-offer bargaining game with
axiomatic Nash bargaining.
Second, in the limit for q→0, the ratio of the equilibrium gains from trade accruing to the





That is, the ratio of the worker’s gains from trade to the firm’s gains from trade is equal to the
ratio 1/(1−β) of the worker’s marginal benefit of a higher wage to the firm’s marginal cost of a
higher wage. For β =0, utility is perfectly transferrable, in the sense that the marginal cost to the
firm of a higher wage is 1, the marginal benefit to the worker of a higher wage is 1 and, thus, the
wage transfers utility at a rate of 1 to 1. In this case, (4) implies that the equilibrium of the BRW
game is such that the gains from trade accruing to the worker and those accruing to the firm are
equated. When β >0, utility is not perfectly transferrable, in the sense that the marginal cost to
the firm of a higher wage is 1−β <1, the marginal benefit to the worker of a higher wage is 1 and,
3. To be precise, there are multiple SPE of the BRW game when the gains from trade are zero. All of the SPEs
are payoff equivalent, but some of them involve agreement and some do not. For the remainder of the section, we restrict
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Figure 2
Structure of generic subgame in SZ game
thus, the wage transfers utility at a rate of 1−β to 1. In this case, (4) implies that the equilibrium
of the BRW game is such that the gains from trade accruing to the worker are 1/(1−β)>1 times
those accruing to the firm. The higher is β, the lower is the firm’s marginal cost of a higher wage,
the higher is the rate at which the wage transfers utility from the firm to the worker, and the higher
is the ratio of the gains from trade accruing to the worker relative to those accruing to the firm.
Again this is a well-known and well-understood result. However, we wished to restate it to point
out that the outcome of the BRW game is such that the firm’s and worker’s gains from trade are
equal only when utility is perfectly transferrable.
2.2. Equilibrium of the SZ game
We begin the analysis of the SZ game by introducing some notation. We denote as n,k(s) the
subgame in which there are n workers in the game, n−k of these workers have already reached
an agreement with the firm for wages summing up to s, k workers have yet to reach an agreement
with the firm, and the firm is about to enter a bargaining session with the first of those k workers.
We denote as win,k(s) the wage of the i-th of k workers without agreement in an SPE of the
subgame n,k(s). The SZ game between the firm and n workers is the subgame n,n(0). We find
it useful to adopt some shorthand notation for the equilibrium outcomes of n,n(0). In particular,
we denote as π̃n the payoff to the firm and with w̃in the payoff to the i-th worker in an SPE of
n,n(0). Clearly, π̃0 =F(0).
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of a generic subgame n,k(s), in which workers 1, 2, … n−k
have reached an agreement with the firm for wages summing up to s and n−k+1, n−k+2, ...,
n is the order of the workers who have yet to reach an agreement with the firm. The subgame
n,k(s) starts with a bargaining session between the firm and worker n−k+1. If the session ends
with an agreement at the wage w, the game enters the subgame n,k−1(s+w), in which workers
1, 2, ..., n−k, n−k+1 have reached an agreement with the firm for wages summing up to s+w
and n−k+2, n−k+3, ..., n is the order of workers who have yet to reach an agreement with
the firm. If the session ends with a breakdown, the worker exits and the game continues with
the subgame n−1,n−1(0), in which workers 1, 2,..., n−k, n−k+2,..., n have yet to reach an
agreement with the firm.
The intuition behind the equilibrium properties of the SZ game can be gained by studying
the game between the firm and two workers. We solve for the SPE of the SZ game 2,2(0) by
backward induction. First, we solve for the SPE of the subgame 1,1(0) which is reached if the
bargaining session between the firm and one of its two workers ends with a breakdown. Second,
we solve for the SPE of the subgame 2,1(w1) which is reached if the bargaining session between
the firm and the first of its two workers ends with an agreement at the wage w1. Third, we solve
for the SPE of the game 2,2(0).
Consider the subgame 1,1(0). It consists of an alternating-offer bargaining session between
the firm and the one worker left in the game. If the session ends with the firm and the worker
agreeing to the wage w1, the payoff to the firm is F(1)−w1 and the payoff to the worker
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the worker is w. The protocol and payoff structure of 1,1(0) is the same as in the BRW game
characterized in Lemma 1 for y=F(1), z= π̃0 and t(w1)=0, which is obviously a linear function
of w1 with derivative −β0 =0. Thus, assuming the gains from trade F(1)−π̃0 −w are positive,








In turn, this implies that the unique SPE is such that the payoff to the firm is





Note that, in the bargaining session between the firm and the only worker left in the game, utility
is perfectly transferrable, as the marginal cost to the firm of a higher wage is 1−β0 =1 and the
marginal benefit to the worker of a higher wage is 1 and, hence, the wage transfers utility from
the firm to the worker at a rate of 1 to 1.
Next, consider the subgame 2,1(w1). It starts with an alternating-offer bargaining session
between the firm and the second worker. If the session ends with the firm and the second worker
agreeing to the wage w2, the game comes to an end. In this case, the payoff to the firm is
F(2)−w1 −w2 and the payoff to the second worker is w2. If the session ends with a breakdown,
the second worker leaves and attains a payoff of w, while the firm enters the subgame 1,1(0)
in which it renegotiates its prior agreement with the first worker. In the unique SPE of 1,1(0),
the payoff to the firm is π̃1. The set of SPE of 2,1(w1) coincides with the set of SPE of a
reduced-form version of 2,1(w1) where the subgames following the end of the bargaining session
between the firm and the second worker are replaced with their associated SPE payoffs (see, e.g.,
Proposition 9.B.3 in Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The reduced-form version of 2,1(w1) has the same
protocol and payoff structure as the BRW game described in Lemma 1 for y=F(2)−w1, z= π̃1
and t(w2)=0, which is obviously a linear function of w2 with derivative −β0 =0. Thus, if the
gains from trade F(2)−w1 −π̃1 −w are negative, any SPE is such that the firm and the worker
do not reach an agreement. If the gains from trade are positive, the unique SPE is such that the








Note that, also in the bargaining session between the firm and the second worker, utility is perfectly
transferrable, as the marginal cost to the firm of a higher wage is 1−β0 =1 and the marginal benefit
to the worker of a higher wage is 1.
Finally, consider the game2,2(0). The game starts with an alternating-offer bargaining session
between the firm and the first worker. There are three qualitatively different outcomes of the
session. First, the session may end with an agreement at the wage w1 ≤F(2)−π̃1 −w. In this
case, the game continues with the subgame 2,1(w1). For w1 ≤F(2)−π̃1 −w, the unique SPE
of 2,1(w1) is such that the firm and the second worker reach an immediate agreement at the
wage w12,1(w1) and, hence, the payoff to the firm is F(2)−w1 −w12,1(w1) and the payoff to the
first worker is w1. Second, the bargaining session between the firm and the first worker may end
with an agreement at the wage w1 >F(2)−π̃1 −w. Also in this case, the game continues with
the subgame 2,1(w1). However, for w1 >F(2)−π̃1 −w, any SPE of the subgame 2,1(w1) is
such that the bargaining session between the firm and the second worker ends with a breakdown.
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of the renegotiation is such that the firm attains a payoff of π̃1 and the first worker attains a
payoff of w̃11. Third, the bargaining session between the firm and the first worker may end with
a breakdown. In this case, the first worker leaves and attains a payoff of w, while the firm enters
the subgame 1,1(0). In the unique SPE of 1,1(0), the payoff to the firm is π̃1.
The set of SPE of 2,2(0) coincides with the set of SPE of a reduced-form version of 2,2(0)
in which the subgames following the bargaining session between the firm and the first worker are
replaced with their associated SPE payoffs. The protocol of the reduced-form version of 2,2(0) is
the same as the protocol of the game described in Lemma 1. The payoff structure of the reduced-
form version of 2,2(0) is not the same as in Lemma 1, because the agreement payoffs for the
firm and the first worker depend on whether w1 leads to a breakdown with the second worker or
not. However, assume that, whenever indifferent, the firm rejects any wage offer from the first
worker that would lead to a breakdown in negotiations with the second worker. Similarly, assume
that, whenever indifferent, the firm chooses not to make any counteroffer to the first worker that
would lead to a breakdown in negotiations with the second worker. Under these tie-breaking
assumptions, we show in Online Appendix C that the outcome of the reduced-form version of
2,2(0) is the same as if the agreement payoffs were F(2)−w1 −w12,1(w1) and w1 for all w1.
We can then apply Lemma 1 for y=F(2), z= π̃1 and t(w1)=w12,1(w1), where t(w1) is a linear
function of w1 with derivative −β1 for β1 =1/(2−q). Thus, if F(2)−π̃1 −w−w12,1(w)≥0 or









In turn, this implies that the payoff to the firm is





Note that, in the bargaining session between the firm and the first of its two workers, utility is
not perfectly transferrable. The marginal benefit to the first worker from receiving a higher wage is
1. The marginal cost to the firm from paying the first worker a higher wage is 1−β1 =1−1/(2−q)
because, if the firm pays the first worker an extra dollar, the gains from trade between the firm and
the second worker fall by 1 dollar and, for this reason, the firm ends up paying the second worker
1/(2−q) dollars less. Therefore, in the bargaining session between the firm and the first of its
two workers, the wage transfers utility at the rate of 1−1/(2−q) to 1, where 1−1/(2−q)<1.
As we will see, this observation has a crucial bearing on the equilibrium payoffs and is the reason
why the SZ-game payoffs are not the Shapley values.
We are now in the position to summarize the outcome of the SZ game 2,2(0) between the
firm and two workers. Assuming F(2)−π̃1 −2w≥0, there is a unique SPE of 2,2(0) in which
the firm reaches an immediate agreement with the first worker for the wage w̃12 in (8). Since
w̃12 ≤F(2)−π̃1 −w, the firm also reaches an immediate agreement with the second worker for the









Evaluating w12,1(w1) at w̃
1
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Substituting out w12,1(w) in (9), we find that the payoff of the firm is























where π̃1 is given by (6). The expressions in (13) are easy to interpret. The term F(2)−π̃1 −2w is
a measure of the overall gains from trade between the firm and the two workers. The expressions
in (13) then state that the first worker in the order captures 1/2 of these gains from trade, while
the second worker in the order and the firm each capture 1/4 of the gains from trade. There is
a simple logic behind this division of the gains from trade. In the bargaining session between
the firm and the second worker, utility is perfectly transferrable. Hence, Lemma 1 implies that
the outcome of the session is such that the gains from trade accruing to the second worker and the
firm are equalized. In the bargaining session between the firm and the first worker, utility is not
perfectly transferrable. In particular, the wage transfers utility from the firm to the first worker at
the rate of 1/2 to 1. Hence, Lemma 1 implies that the outcome of the session is such that the gains
from trade accruing to the first worker are twice as large as those accruing to the firm. From these
observations, it follows that the first worker captures 1/2, while the second worker and the firm
each capture 1/4 of the gains from trade. Intuitively, the first worker captures a larger fraction
of the gains from trade than the second worker because he can take advantage of the fact that
the firm’s marginal cost of paying him a higher wage is lower. The first worker captures a larger
fraction of the gains from trade than the firm because the gains from trade accruing to the firm
and the second worker are equal.
The following theorem generalizes the characterization of the SPE of the SZ game between
the firm and two workers in the limit for q→0 to the case of n workers.
Theorem 1. (Stole and Zwiebel game). Consider the SZ game n,n(0) between the firm and n
workers. Assume that the overall gains from trade are positive, i.e. F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0. In the
limit for q→0, the unique SPE of the game is such that the firm reaches an agreement with all
of the workers without delay. The payoff π̃n to the firm is given by the difference equation




2j , for j=1,2,...n, (14)






Proof. In Appendix A. ‖
Theorem 1 states that the SPE payoffs of the SZ game n,n(0) are such that the first worker
in the order captures 1/2 of the overall gains from trade F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw. The second worker
in the order captures 1/4 of the gains from trade. More generally, the i-th worker in the order
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behind these payoffs is simple. In the bargaining session between the firm and the i-th worker,
the wage transfers utility at the rate of 1/2n−i to 1. In fact, the i-th worker’s marginal benefit
from receiving a higher wage is 1. The firm’s marginal cost of paying the i-th worker a higher
wage is only 1/2n−i because, if the firm pays the i-th worker 1 extra dollar, it will lower the sum
of wages paid to the following workers by 1−1/2n−i dollars less. Hence, the outcome of the
bargaining session between the firm and the i-th worker is such that the gains from trade accruing
to the worker are 2n−i as large as those accruing to the firm. These observations imply that the
i-th worker captures 1/2i of the gains from trade and the firm captures 1/2n of the gains from
trade.
2.3. Properties of the solution of the SZ game
Having characterized the SPE of the SZ game, we now turn to discuss some of its properties.
The first property we wish to discuss is the relationship between its solution and the axiomatic
bargaining solution of Shapley: The SPE payoffs of the SZ game are not the Shapley values. When
the firm has n workers, the Shapley value π∗n of the firm is given by the difference equation4
π∗j =π∗j−1 + [F( j)−π∗j−1 −jw]
/
(1+j), for j=1,2,...n, (16)
with initial condition π∗0 =F(0). The Shapley value w∗n of each of the n workers is given by
w∗n =w+ [F(n)−π∗n−1 −nw]
/
(1+n). (17)
In words, the Shapley values are such that the firm and every worker each capture the same share
1/(1+n) of the gains from trade, where the gains from trade are defined as F(n)−π∗n−1 −nw. The
SZ-game payoffs differ from the Shapley values in two dimensions. First, the SZ-game payoff to
the firm is different from the Shapley value of the firm for any n≥2. To see this, notice that the
difference equations defining the firm’s equilibrium payoff and the difference equation defining
the firm’s Shapley value have the same structure but different coefficients in front of the term
F( j)−πj−1 −jw. Namely, 1/2j for the equilibrium payoff and 1/(1+j) for the Shapley value.
Since the coefficients are different for all j≥2, the firm’s equilibrium payoff is different from
the firm’s Shapley value for all n≥2. Second, the equilibrium payoff to a worker depends on the
worker’s position in the bargaining order, while the Shapley value is the same for every worker.
This implies that the workers’ SZ-game payoffs are different from the workers’ Shapley values
for any particular ordering of n≥2 workers. Moreover, since the SZ-game payoff to the firm is
different from its Shapley value while the sum of all the players’ SZ-game payoffs is the same
as the sum of the Shapley values, the workers’ SZ-game payoffs are different from the workers’
Shapley values also in expectation over any distribution of orderings for any n≥2.
The second property of the SZ game that we wish to discuss is substantive: Workers are paid
different wages even though they are identical and they are employed by the same firm. There
is empirical evidence (see, e.g., Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) documenting intra-firm wage
inequality, i.e. inequality among workers who appear to be similar and who are employed by the
same firm. The SZ game provides a possible explanation for this type of inequality based on the
idea that workers who bargain earlier with the firm are in a better strategic position than workers
who bargain later and earn higher wages. A compelling empirical test of this explanation would
require information on the order in which workers bargain with the firm. Such data are not easily
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Figure 3
Profits and hiring for F(n)=n 23 and w=0.4
available. However, Buhai et al. (2014) have data on the seniority of workers within a firm (where
seniority is defined as the tenure of a worker relative to the tenure of his coworkers), which is
perhaps the most natural order in which a firm might approach its employees when negotiating
wages. If, indeed, seniority is related to the bargaining order, the finding in Buhai et al. (2014)
that seniority has a positive effect on wages even after controlling for tenure is consistent with
the SZ game explanation for intra-firm wage inequality.
The third property of the SZ game that we wish to discuss is also substantive: If wages are
determined by the SZ game, the firm has an incentive to hire more workers than it would in a
competitive labour market where it takes the wage w as given.5 First, consider the case in which
the firm hires workers in a competitive market where the wage w is given. If the firm hires n
workers, it attains a payoff of
πCn =F(n)−nw. (18)
Since F(n) is strictly concave in n, so is the firm’s payoff πCn . Therefore, there exists a unique
number nC of workers that maximizes the payoff of the firm. Moreover, the payoff to the firm πCn
is strictly increasing in n for all n≤nC and strictly decreasing in n for all n≥nC . The properties
of πCn and nC are illustrated in Figure 3.
Now, consider the case in which wages are determined by the SZ game. If the firm hires n
workers, it attains a payoff π̃n which satisfies the difference equation (14). The solution to this











The payoff π̃n is strictly smaller than the competitive payoff πCn for all n≤nC . This property
follows from the fact that π̃n is a weighted average of πCi for i=0,1,...n and πCi is strictly
increasing in i for all i≤nC . The increase π̃n −π̃n−1 in the payoff from hiring n rather than
n−1 workers is strictly positive for all n≤nC . This property follows from the observations that
π̃n −π̃n−1 has the same sign as πCn −π̃n−1 and πCn −π̃n−1 >πCn−1 −π̃n−1 >0 for all n≤nC . From
this property of π̃n −π̃n−1, it follows that the number nSZ of workers that maximizes the firm’s
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payoff π̃n when wages are set as by the SZ game is greater than nC . From the fact that π̃n −π̃n−1
has the same sign as πCn −π̃n−1, it follows that nSZ is such that the firm’s payoff π̃n is equal to
the competitive payoff πCn up to integer rounding
6, i.e. π̃nSZ
.=πCnSZ . The properties of π̃n and nSZ
are illustrated in Figure 3.
It is also useful to consider the case in which wages are given by the workers’ Shapley values.
If the firm hires n workers, it attains a payoff of π∗n which satisfies the difference equation (16).





The payoff π∗n is strictly smaller than the competitive payoff πCn for all n≤nC , as π∗n is a weighted
average of πCi for i=0,1,...n. The increase π∗n −π∗n−1 in the payoff from hiring n rather than
n−1 workers is strictly positive for all n≤nC , as π∗n −π∗n−1 has the same sign as πCn −π∗n−1
and πCn −π∗n−1 >πCn−1 −π∗n−1 >0 for all n≤nC . Therefore, the number of workers nSH that
maximizes the firm’s payoff π∗n when wages are set according to the Shapley values is greater
than nC . Moreover, nSH is such that the firm’s payoff π∗n is equal to the competitive payoff πCn
up to integer rounding, i.e. π̃nSH
.=πCnSH . To compare nSH and nSZ , notice that, while both π∗n
and π̃n are weighted averages of πCi for i=0,1,...n, π∗n places more weight on high values of
i and less weight on low values of i. Using this observation, we can show that π∗n ≥ π̃n for all
n≤nSH and, hence, πCn −π̃n−1 >πCn −π∗n−1 >0 for all n≤nSH . Since π̃n −π̃n−1 has the same
sign as πCn −π̃n−1, it then follows that nSZ is greater than nSH . The properties of π∗n and nSH are
illustrated in Figure 3.
There is a simple intuition behind the finding that nC ≤nSH ≤nSZ . For all wage setting
mechanisms, the firm’s benefit from hiring an n-th worker is positive as long as the gains from
trade F(n)−nw−πn−1 are positive. For different wage setting mechanisms, the firm captures a
different share of the gains from trade, which implies that the firm’s payoff πn−1 from having n−1
workers is different. If wages are set competitively, the firm captures all the gains from trade,
which implies πCn−1 =F(n−1)−(n−1)w. If wages are given by the Shapley values, the firm
captures only a fraction of the gains from trade, which implies π∗n−1 <π
C
n−1. If wages are given
by the SZ game, the firm captures an even smaller fraction of the gains from trade, which implies
π̃n−1 <π∗n−1. Since π̃n−1 <π∗n−1 <πCn−1 and hiring continues as long as F(n)−nw−πn−1 >0,
it follows that the firm hires more workers if wages are set by the SZ game than if they are set by
the Shapley values and, in turn, more workers if wages are set by the Shapley values than if they
are set competitively.
Up to this point, we have stressed the differences between the SZ-game payoffs and the
Shapley values. Notwithstanding these differences, it is important to recognize that the SZ-game
payoffs and the Shapley values share a common structure in which the payoff πn to the firm is
given by a difference equation of the form
πj =πj−1 +λj[F( j)−πj−1 −jw], for j=1,2,...n, (21)
6. The payoff-maximizing employment level nSZ is such that π̃n =πCn up to integer rounding. From (14), it then
follows that nSZ is such that the gains from trade F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw are equal to zero up to integer rounding and, hence, all
workers earn approximately a wage equal to their outside option w. Thus, at the payoff-maximizing level of employment
nSZ the outcome of the SZ game does not feature intra-firm wage dispersion. However, this prediction is an artefact of the
assumption of costless hiring. If, as is the case in labour-search models, hiring is costly, the firm would hire fewer than
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and the payoff win to the i-th worker is given by an expression of the type
win =w+μin[F(n)−πn−1 −nw], (22)
with λn +∑ni=1μin =1. The key feature of this common structure is that firm and workers share
a notion of gains from trade given by F(n)−πn−1 −nw, i.e. the output F(n) that the firm and n
workers produce together net of the sum nw of the payoffs that each worker can attain if he were
excluded from production and the payoff πn−1 that the firm could attain if it were to bargain with
n−1 rather than n workers. The SZ-game payoffs share this structure with the Shapley values
because of the assumption that—when the bargaining session between the firm and one of the
n workers breaks down—the worker exits the game and the firm starts the game over with n−1
workers. The SZ-game payoffs are different from the Shapley values because the division of the
gains from trade among players is different. In light of their common structure, one could say
that the SZ game delivers a generalized version of the Shapley values.7
The above observations are important as they provide a recipe to construct an extensive-form
bargaining game that yields the Shapley values. Such a game should maintain the assumption that
a breakdown in a bargaining session between firm and worker causes the worker to exit and the
firm to restart the whole bargaining process, but it should modify the protocol of the bargaining
session so that the firm and the worker always capture an equal share of the gains from trade. The
Rolodex game in the next section follows this recipe.
3. THE ROLODEX GAME
In this section, we propose a novel bargaining game between a firm and n workers. We refer to
it as the Rolodex game. In Section 3.1, we describe the extensive form of the Rolodex game and
relate it to the extensive form of the SZ game. In Section 3.2, we characterize the unique no-delay
SPE of the Rolodex game. We find that, in equilibrium, a worker captures the same fraction of
the gains from trade as the firm, irrespective of the order in which he bargains with the firm.
Moreover, the relevant notion of gains from trade is given by the difference between the output
produced by the firm and n workers net of the sum of the payoffs that the workers can attain if
they are excluded from the game and the payoff that the firm can attain by bargaining with n−1
rather than n workers. We show that these properties of equilibrium imply that the payoffs to the
workers and to the firm are equal to their Shapley values.
3.1. Environment
We start by describing the extensive form of the Rolodex game. The game consists of a sequence
of bilateral bargaining sessions between the firm and one of the workers. Workers are placed in
some arbitrary queue from 1 to n. The game starts with a bargaining session between the firm
and the first worker in the initial queue. The bargaining session involves the determination of
the worker’s wage and ends with an agreement, a rotation of the rolodex, or a breakdown. If the
7. In Section 3, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) consider a generalized version of their payoff equations, derived under
the assumption that the outcome of the bargaining session between the firm and a worker is such that the two parties
divide the gains from trade according to some arbitrary share, which is identical for every worker but allowed to depend
on the total number of workers n. The firm’s generalized payoff is the same as in (21). The worker’s generalized payoff
is not the same as in (22), because (22) allows for the possibility—a possibility that materializes in the equilibrium of the
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Figure 4
Sequence of bargaining sessions in Rolodex game
session ends with agreement, the firm enters a bargaining session with the worker who, among
those without an agreement, is next in the queue. If the session ends with a rotation of the rolodex,
the worker moves to the end of the queue of workers without agreement. Then the firm enters
a bargaining session with the worker who, among those who have yet to reach an agreement, is
next in the updated queue. If the session ends with a breakdown, the worker exits the game and
the entire bargain process starts over.8 The game ends when the firm has reached an agreement
with all the workers still in the game. Figure 4 illustrates the sequence of the bargaining sessions
in the Rolodex game, where the number in the box denotes the position in the original queue of
the worker with whom the firm is bargaining at that time.
Each bargaining session between the firm and a worker involves, at most, one offer and one
counteroffer. The session starts with the worker making a wage offer to the firm. If the firm
accepts the offer, the session ends with an agreement and the firm starts bargaining with the
worker who, among those without an agreement, is next in the queue. If the firm rejects the offer,
the session ends with a breakdown with probability q and continues with probability 1−q. If the
session continues, the firm makes a wage counteroffer to the worker. If the worker accepts the
counteroffer, the session ends with an agreement and the firm starts bargaining with the worker
without agreement who is next in the queue. If the worker rejects the counteroffer, the session
ends with a breakdown with probability q and ends with a rotation of the rolodex with probability
1−q.
There is only one difference between the protocols of the Rolodex and SZ games. In the SZ
game, a bargaining session between a firm and a worker continues until the firm and the worker
reach an agreement or the worker leaves the game. That is, a worker can keep rejecting the
counteroffers of the firm without losing his place in the queue. In the Rolodex game, a worker
moves to the end of the queue when he rejects a firm’s counteroffer. Under the SZ protocol, a
worker at the head of the queue can take advantage of the fact that—if the firm pays him an extra
dollar—it will pay the workers who follow him in the queue a lower wage. In contrast, under the
Rolodex protocol, any worker is in the same strategic position as the last worker in the queue. In
fact, if any worker rejects the firm’s counteroffer, he becomes the last worker and, thus, the firm
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Figure 5
Structure of generic subgame in Rolodex game
can successfully offer him the same wage that is earned by the last worker and the worker can only
successfully demand the same wage that is earned by the last worker. In equilibrium, any worker
captures the same share of the gains from trade as the last worker in the queue. Since the last
worker in the queue captures the same share of the gains from trade as the firm, all players capture
an equal share of the gains from trade, as per the Shapley values. Moreover, since the Rolodex
protocol maintains the assumption that a breakdown in a bargaining session causes the worker to
exit and the firm to restart the whole bargaining process, the notion of the gains from trade is the
same as in the Shapley values. Taken together, these two features imply that the Rolodex game
yields the Shapley values.
3.2. Solution of the Rolodex game
We are interested in the no-delay Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the Rolodex game, i.e. equilibria
with the property that the firm and the workers reach an agreement without delay in any subgame
in which the gains from trade are positive.9 We shall use the same notation for the Rolodex game
as for the SZ game. That is, we denote as n,k(s) the subgame in which there are n workers in the
game, n−k of these workers have already reached an agreement with the firm for wages summing
up to s, k workers have yet to reach an agreement with the firm, and the firm is about to enter a
bargaining session with the first of those k workers. We denote as win,k(s) the wage of the i-th of
the k workers without agreement in a no-delay SPE of the subgame n,k(s). The Rolodex game
between the firm and n workers is then n,n(0). We use the shorthand π̃n to denote the payoff to
the firm and w̃in to denote the payoff to the i-th worker in a no-delay SPE of n,n(0).
Figure 5 illustrates the structure of a generic subgame n,k(s), in which workers 1, 2, ..., n−k
have reached an agreement with the firm for wages summing up to s and n−k+1, n−k+2, ... , n
is the queue of workers who have yet to reach an agreement with the firm. The subgame n,k(s)
starts with a bargaining session between the firm and worker n−k+1. If the session ends with
agreement at the wage w, the game enters the subgame n,k−1(s+w), in which workers 1, 2, ...,
n−k+1 have reached an agreement with the firm for wages summing up to s+w and n−k+2,
n−k+3, ... , n is the queue of workers who have yet to reach an agreement with the firm. If
the session ends with a rotation of the rolodex, the game enters the subgame n,k(s), in which
workers 1,2,...n−k have reached an agreement with the firm for wages summing up to s and
n−k+2, n−k+3,... , n, n−k+1 is the queue of workers who have yet to reach an agreement
with the firm. If the session ends with a breakdown, the worker exits and the game continues with
9. For some configurations of the parameters, we were able to construct Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the Rolodex
game with delay. For this article, however, we decided to restrict the analysis to no-delay SPE to facilitate the comparison
between the Rolodex game, the SZ game and, more generally, the literature, since most perfect-information bargaining
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the subgame n−1,n−1(0), in which workers 1, 2, ..., n−k, n−k+2, ... , n have yet to reach an
agreement with the firm.
The intuition behind the equilibrium properties of the Rolodex game can be gained by studying
the game between the firm and two workers. We solve for the no-delay SPE of the Rolodex game
2,2(0) by backward induction. First, we solve for the no-delay SPE of the subgame 1,1(0)
which is reached if the bargaining session between the firm and one of its two workers ends with
a breakdown. Second, we solve for the no-delay SPE of the subgame 2,1(w1) which is reached
if the bargaining session between the firm and one of its two workers ends with an agreement at
the wage w1. Third, we solve for the no-delay SPE of the game 2,2(0).
Consider the subgame 1,1(0). It begins with the worker making a wage offer to the firm. If
the offer is rejected, the firm makes a counteroffer to the worker. If the counteroffer is rejected,
a rotation of the rolodex takes place and the worker is moved from the top to the bottom of the
queue. However, as there are no other workers in the game, the rotation leaves the worker at the
top of the queue. Thus, the worker and the firm continue in alternating offers and counteroffers
until either they reach an agreement or until the negotiation breaks down. If the firm and the
worker agree to the wage w1, the subgame ends. In this case, the payoff to the firm is F(1) and the
payoff to the worker is w1. If the negotiation breaks down, the subgame also ends. In this case,
however, the payoff to the firm is π̃0 and the payoff to the worker is w. Overall, the protocol and
the payoff structure of the subgame 1,1(0) are the same as in BRW and the SPE of the subgame
is given by Lemma 1 for y=F(1), z= π̃0 and t(w1)=0. Therefore, assuming the gains from trade
F(1)−π̃0 −w are positive, the unique SPE of the subgame 1,1(0) is such that the firm and the
worker immediately agree to the wage
w̃11 =w+
1
2−q [F(1)−π̃0 −w]. (23)
In turn, this implies that the payoff to the firm is
π̃1 = π̃0 + 1−q2−q [F(1)−π̃0 −w]. (24)
Now, consider the subgame 2,1(w1). It starts with a bargaining session between the firm
and the worker with whom the firm has yet to reach an agreement. As there are no other workers
without an agreement, the rotation of the rolodex does not affect the worker’s position in the queue.
Hence, the bargaining session is such that the worker and the firm alternate in making offers and
counteroffers until either they reach an agreement or until the negotiation breaks down. If the
firm and the worker agree to the wage w2, the game ends, the payoff to the firm is F(2)−w1 −w2
and the payoff to the worker is w2. If the negotiation breaks down, the worker exits and the
payoff to the worker is w. The firm enters the subgame 1,1(0), in which it renegotiates its prior
agreement with the other worker. In the unique SPE of 1,1(0), the payoff to the firm is π̃1. The
reduced-form version of the subgame 2,1(w1) in which the continuation subgames are replaced
with the associated SPE payoffs has the same protocol and the same payoff structure as in BRW
for y=F(2)−w1, z= π̃1 and t(w2)=0. Therefore, if the gains from trade F(2)−w1 −π̃1 −w are
negative, any SPE of 2,1(w1) is such that the firm and the worker do not reach an agreement. If
the gains from trade are positive, the unique SPE of 2,1(w1) is such that the firm and the worker
immediately reach an agreement at the wage
w12,1(w1)=w+
1






/restud/article-abstract/86/2/564/4839065 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 20 July 2020
[11:28 2/2/2019 OP-REST180030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 582 564–592
582 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Next, consider the game 2,2(0). Assume that the gains from trade F(2)−π̃1 −2w are
positive. To characterize the unique no-delay equilibrium, we use the standard method of
proof for Rubinstein-style models developed by Shaked and Sutton (1984), which proceeds by
characterizing the suprema and infima of the sets of equilibrium payoffs (see also Section 3.2.2
in Muthoo (1999)). Let mW and MW denote the infimum and the supremum among all no-delay
SPE of the offer made by a worker to the firm, given that the other worker has yet to reach
an agreement with the firm. Similarly, let mF and MF denote the infimum and the supremum
among all no-delay SPE of the counteroffer made by the firm to a worker, given that the firm
has yet to reach an agreement with the other worker. A worker can always attain the payoff w
by making offers greater than w and rejecting all offers smaller than w. Since we are looking for
SPEs in which all equilibrium offers and counteroffers are immediately accepted, MW ≥mW ≥w
and MF ≥mF ≥w. If the firm agrees with the worker to a wage w1 >w, with w≡F(2)−π̃1 −w,
the firm enters the subgame 2,1(w1) where it does not reach an agreement with the other worker.
Since we are looking for no-delay SPE, mW ≤MW ≤w and mF ≤MF ≤w. Further, note that, if
the firm and the worker reach an agreement at any wage w1 ≤w, the firm enters the subgame
2,1(w1) where it reaches an immediate agreement with the other worker at a wage of w12,1(w1).
Consider any no-delay SPE of 2,2(0). First, we characterize the worker’s equilibrium payoff
from accepting/rejecting a counteroffer ŵc ∈[w,w] from the firm, given that the other worker is
without agreement.10 If the worker accepts the counteroffer, he attains a payoff of ŵc. In fact, if
the worker accepts, the firm reaches an agreement with the other worker at the wage w12,1(ŵc), the
game comes to an end, and the worker is paid the wage ŵc. If the worker rejects the counteroffer,
he attains a payoff between11 qw+(1−q)w12,1(MW ) and qw+(1−q)w12,1(mW ). In fact, if the
worker rejects, he exits the game with probability q. In this case, the worker attains a payoff of
w. With probability 1−q, the worker moves to the end of the queue. In this case, the firm and
the worker agree to the wage w12,1(wo) after the firm and the other worker reach an agreement to
some wage wo ∈[mW ,MW ]. Since w12,1(wo) is strictly decreasing in wo, the payoff to the worker
from rejecting ŵc is between qw+(1−q)w12,1(MW ) and qw+(1−q)w12,1(mW ).
Second, we characterize the firm’s equilibrium counteroffer wc ∈[w,w]. The equilibrium
counteroffer wc is accepted by the worker. The worker’s decision can be optimal only if the
payoff from accepting wc is greater than the payoff from rejecting wc. Since the infimum of the
firm’s counteroffer wc is mF , the worker’s acceptance payoff is wc, and the rejection payoff is
greater than qw+(1−q)w12,1(MW ), we have
mF ≥qw+(1−q)w12,1(MW ). (26)
Similarly, note that, in equilibrium, the worker finds it optimal to accept any counteroffer ŵc ∈
[w,w] greater than qw+(1−q)w12,1(mW ). Thus, if the firm makes such a counteroffer, its payoff
is F(2)−ŵc −w12,1(ŵc). Since F(2)−ŵc −w12,1(ŵc) is strictly decreasing in ŵc and wc ∈[w,w],
the firm’s equilibrium counteroffer wc can be optimal only if it is no greater than qw+(1−
q)w12,1(mW ). As the supremum of the firm’s counteroffer wc is MF , we have
MF ≤qw+(1−q)w12,1(mW ). (27)
10. In what follows, we use ŵo and ŵc to denote generic offers and counteroffers, and wo and wc to denote offers
and counteroffers in an arbitrary no-delay SPE. Later, we use w∗o and w∗c to denote offers and counteroffers in the unique
no-delay SPE.
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Third, we characterize the firm’s equilibrium payoff from accepting/rejecting an offer
ŵo ∈[w,w] from a worker, given that the other worker is without agreement. If the firm accepts the
offer, it attains a payoff of F(2)−ŵo −w12,1(ŵo). If the firm rejects the offer, its payoff is between12
qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−MF −w12,1(MF )] and qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−mF −w12,1(mF )]. In fact, if the firm
rejects the offer, the worker exits the game with probability q. In this case, the firm attains a payoff
of π̃1. With probability 1−q, the firm makes a counteroffer. In this case, the firm and the worker
agree to some wage wc ∈[mF ,MF ] and then the firm and the other worker agree to the wage
w12,1(wc). Since F(2)−wc −w12,1(wc) is strictly decreasing in wc, the firm’s payoff from rejecting
ŵo is between qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−MF −w12,1(MF )] and qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−mF −w12,1(mF )].
Fourth, we characterize the worker’s equilibrium offer wo ∈[w,w]. The equilibrium offer wo
is accepted by the firm. The firm’s decision can be optimal only if the payoff from accepting wo
is greater than the payoff from rejecting wo. Since the supremum of the worker’s offer is MW , the
firm’s acceptance payoff is F(2)−wo −w12,1(wo), and the firm’s rejection payoff is greater than
qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−MF −w12,1(MF )], we have
F(2)−MW −w12,1(MW )≥qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−MF −w12,1(MF )]. (28)
Similarly, note that, in equilibrium, the firm accepts any offer ŵo ∈[w,w] such that the acceptance
payoff is greater than the upper bound on the rejection payoff qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−mF −
w12,1(mF )]. Hence, if the worker makes such an offer, his payoff is ŵo. Since the firm’s acceptance
payoff is strictly decreasing in ŵo and wo ∈[w,w], the worker’s equilibrium offer wo ∈[w,w] can
be optimal only if the firm’s acceptance payoff is no greater than the upper bound on the firm’s
rejection payoff. As the infimum of the worker’s offer wo is mW , we have
F(2)−mW −w12,1(mW )≤qπ̃1 +(1−q)[F(2)−mF −w12,1(mF )]. (29)
The inequalities (26)–(29) provide bounds on the equilibrium offers mW and MW and




1+(1−q)+(1−q)2 [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]. (30)
Similarly, it is easy to show that mW =MW =w∗o where
w∗o =w+
1
1+(1−q)+(1−q)2 [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]. (31)
We are now in the position to construct a candidate no-delay SPE of 2,2(0). In the candidate
SPE, a worker makes the offer w∗o to the firm whenever the other worker is without agreement.
The firm accepts any offer ŵo such that ŵo ≤w∗o and rejects any other offer. The firm makes the
counteroffer w∗c to a worker whenever the other worker is without agreement. The worker accepts
any counteroffer ŵc such that ŵc ≥w∗c and ŵc ≤w and rejects any counteroffer ŵc <w∗c .13 The
strategies and payoffs associated with the subgames following an agreement or a breakdown
with the first of two workers without agreement are those implied by the no-delay SPE of
12. The interval is non-empty as w1 +w12,1(w1) is strictly increasing in w1.
13. We do not need to specify the worker’s response to a counteroffer ŵc >w because the firm never finds it optimal
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2,1(w1) and 1,1(0). It is easy to verify that this candidate no-delay SPE is indeed an equilibrium
(see Appendix B). Moreover, it is obvious that the no-delay SPE constructed above is unique with
respect to outcomes and payoffs, as mW =MW =w∗o implies that, in any no-delay SPE, the worker
makes the offer w∗o and the firm accepts it.
We can now compute the equilibrium outcomes and payoffs in the unique no-delay SPE of
2,2(0). Assuming F(2)−π̃1 −2w≥0, the firm and the first worker reach an immediate agreement
at the wage w̃12 =w∗o , while the firm and the second worker reach an immediate agreement at the
wage w̃22 =w12,1(w∗o). Therefore, the wage (and payoff) of the first worker is given by
w̃12 =w+
1
1+(1−q)+(1−q)2 [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]. (32)
The wage (and payoff) of the second worker is
w̃22 =w+
1−q
1+(1−q)+(1−q)2 [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]. (33)
The payoff of the firm is
π̃2 = π̃1 + (1−q)
2
1+(1−q)+(1−q)2 [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]. (34)
For q→0, the payoffs to the workers and the firm are
w̃12 =w+ [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]
/
3,
w̃22 =w+ [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]
/
3, (35)
π̃2 = π̃1 + [F(2)−π̃1 −2w]
/
3,
where π̃1 is given by (24). It is easy to understand why the SPE payoffs of the Rolodex game
are given by (35). A breakdown in the bargaining session between the firm and either worker
causes the worker to exit the game and the firm to restart the entire negotiation process with
only one worker. For this reason, the overall gains from trade are given by F(2)−π̃1 −2w. The
bargaining session between the firm and the second worker is as in the BRW game with perfectly
transferrable utility. For this reason, the gains from trade accruing to the firm are the same as the
gains from trade accruing to the second worker. The bargaining session between the firm and the
first worker is such that, if the worker rejects the counteroffer of the firm, he moves to the end of
the queue. For this reason, the first worker is in the same strategic position and captures the same
gains from trade as the second worker. Taken together, these observations imply that the firm and
every worker capture the same fraction (1/3) of the gains from trade F(2)−π̃1 −2w. These are
the Shapley values.
The following theorem generalizes the characterization of the no-delay SPE of the Rolodex
game between the firm and two workers to the case of n workers.
Theorem 2. (Rolodex game). Consider the Rolodex game n,n(0) between the firm and n
workers. Assume that the gains from trade are positive, i.e. F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0. In the limit
for q→0, the unique no-delay SPE of the game is such that the payoff to the firm is given by the
difference equation
π̃j = π̃j−1 + [F( j)−π̃j−1 −jw]
/
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with initial condition π̃0 =F(0). The payoff to the i-th of n workers is given by
w̃in =w+ [F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw]
/
(1+n). (37)
Proof. In Appendix B. ‖
Three comments about Theorem 2 are in order. First, note that the SPE payoffs of the Rolodex
game between the firm and n workers are equal to the Shapley values. The firm’s Rolodex payoff is
given by the solution to (36) which is the same difference equation that characterizes the Shapley
value of the firm. Thus, π̃j =π∗j for j=0,1,...n. Each worker’s Rolodex payoff is given by (37)
which is the Shapley value of the worker. Thus, w̃in =w∗n for i=1,2,...n. The Rolodex payoffs
are equal to the Shapley values because, in equilibrium, the firm and every worker capture an
equal share of the gains from trade–exactly as in the Shapley values—and the notion of gains
from trade is given by F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw—exactly as in the Shapley values. The reason why the
Rolodex payoffs are such that every player captures an equal share 1/(n+1) of the gains from
trade and the reason why the notion of the gains is given by F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw are exactly the
same as in the case of two workers.
Second, if wages are determined by the Rolodex game, the firm has an incentive to hire more
workers than it would in a competitive labour market where it takes the wage w as given. However,
the firm has an incentive to hire fewer workers if wages are determined by the Rolodex game than
if wages were determined by the SZ game. These findings follow immediately from the analysis
in Section 2.3 of the firm’s hiring decision when wages are given by the Shapley values, together
with the observation that the equilibrium payoffs of the Rolodex game are the Shapley values.
For the same reason, many of the results about the firm’s organizational design and technology
choice in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a and 1996b) and in follow-up papers—results that are derived
under the premise that the equilibrium payoffs of the SZ game are the Shapley values—can be
applied directly to an environment in which wages are determined by the Rolodex game.
Third, Theorem 2 shows that the Rolodex game yields the Shapley values in the context of the
wage bargaining between a firm and its workers. The context is restrictive along two dimensions:
(1) the firm is essential in production; (2) the network in which negotiations occur has a star
graph, i.e. one central player bargains with a number of other players who do not interact directly
with each other. In a follow-up paper (Brügemann et al., 2017) we analyse the Rolodex game in a
more general context. First, we remove the assumption that one player is essential in production
and instead allow the worth of coalitions to be described by a general characteristic function.
We show that the equilibrium payoffs are the Myerson–Shapley values for the corresponding
star graph. Second, we adapt the extensive form to accommodate a general graph of connections
between players: instead of a central player rotating through the other players, the game rotates
through bilateral connections without agreement. We show that, for this graph, the equilibrium
payoffs are the Myerson–Shapley values.14
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we analysed two perfect-information wage bargaining games between a firm and
its workers. We first revisited the bargaining game of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). We showed
that, in the unique SPE of this game, the payoffs to the workers and the firm are different from
those reported in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and, hence, different from the Shapley values. We
14. The generalized Rolodex game yields the same equilibrium payoffs as those obtained by De Fontenay and Gans
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then proposed a novel bargaining game, which we dubbed the Rolodex game. We showed that,
in the unique no-delay SPE of this game, the payoffs to the workers and the firm are the Shapley
values. Thus, the Rolodex game results offers a game-theoretic foundation for those who wish to
use the Shapley values as the outcome of wage negotiations between a firm and its workers.
APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The following proposition contains the characterization of the unique SPE of the subgame n,n(0) in which the firm has
yet to reach an agreement with all of the n workers remaining in the game.
Proposition A.1. Consider the subgame n,n(0). (1) If F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw<0, any SPE is such that the firm does not
reach an agreement with all of the n workers. The payoff to the firm is given by π̃n = π̃n−1. (2) If F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0,
the unique SPE is such that the firm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the n workers. The payoff to the firm
is given by






















For n=1, Proposition A.1 holds as the payoffs in (A1) and (A2) boil down to the equilibrium payoffs of the BRW
game. For n=2, Proposition A.1 holds as the payoffs in (A1) and (A2) are those derived in Section 2.2. In what follows
we are going to prove that Proposition A.1 holds for a generic n by induction. That is, we are going to prove that if the
proposition holds for the subgame n,n(0), it also holds for the subgame n+1,n+1(0) where the firm has yet to reach an
agreement with all of the n+1 workers left in the game.
Central to the characterization of the equilibrium of n+1,n+1(0) is the following proposition.
Proposition A.2. Consider the subgame n+1,k(s) in which the firm has n+1 workers, it has yet to reach an agreement
with k ≤n+1 workers, and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the first n+1−k workers. (1) If F(n+1)−
s−π̃n −kw<0, any SPE is such that the firm does not reach an agreement with all the k remaining workers; (2) If
F(n+1)−s−π̃n −kw≥0, the unique SPE is such that the firm reaches an immediate agreement with each of the k











For k =1, Proposition A.2 holds as the payoffs in (A3) are the same as those in the BRW game. We prove that
Proposition A.2 holds for any k ≤n+1 by induction. That is, we prove that, if Proposition A.2 holds for some arbitrary
k ≤n, then it also holds for k+1. To this aim, we consider the subgame n+1,k+1(s), in which the firm has n+1 employees,
it has yet to reach an agreement with k+1 of them and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the first n−k workers.
As usual, we characterize the solution to this subgame by backward induction.
First, consider the subgame n,n(0) in which, after a breakdown in negotiations between the firm and the first of the
k+1 workers without agreement, bargaining starts over between the firm and the n workers left in the game. Since we
have conjectured that Proposition A.1 holds when the firm has n workers, the SPE payoff of the firm in this subgame
is π̃n.
Second, consider the subgame n+1,k(s+w1) in which, after the firm has reached an agreement at some wage w1
with the first worker without an agreement, the firm starts bargaining with the other k workers without an agreement.
Since we conjectured that Proposition A.2 holds when the firm has n+1 workers and has yet to reach an agreement with
k of them, there is a unique SPE to this subgame. In particular, if w1 >w≡F(n+1)−s−π̃n −kw, the SPE is such that the
firm does not reach an agreement with all of the k remaining workers. In this case, the firm’s payoff is π̃n. If w1 ≤w, the
SPE is such that the firm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the k remaining workers. In this case, the firm’s
payoff is F(n+1)−s−w1 −tn+1,k(s+w1).
Third, we characterize the solution to the subgame n+1,k+1(s). Consider the bargaining session between the firm and
the first of the k+1 workers without an agreement. If the firm and the worker do not reach an agreement, the worker exits
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is w. If the firm and the worker agree to a wage w1 >w, the firm enters the subgame n+1,k(s+w1) with negative gains
from trade. In this case, the payoff to the firm is π̃n and the payoff to the worker is the wage earned by the (n−k+1)-th
worker in the game with n workers. Finally, if the firm and the worker agree to a wage w1 ≤w, the firm enters the subgame
n+1,k(s+w1) with positive gains from trade. In this case, the firm reaches an agreement with all the other workers, the
payoff to the firm is F(n+1)−s−w1 −tn+1,k(s+w1) and the payoff to the worker is w1. Notice that tn+1,k(s+w1) is
linear and of the form
tn+1,k(s+w1)=αk −βkw1, (A4)







Consider the reduced-form version of the subgame n+1,k+1(s) in which the subgames following the bargaining
session between the firm and the first of the k+1 workers without agreement are replaced with the associated SPE
payoffs. The reduced form of n+1,k+1(s) has the same protocol as the BRW game, but not the same payoff structure.
However, assume that, whenever indifferent, the firm rejects any wage offer from the worker that would lead to a breakdown
in negotiations with one of the subsequent workers. Similarly, assume that, whenever indifferent, the firm chooses not to
make any counteroffer to the worker that would lead to a breakdown with subsequent workers. Under these tie-breaking
assumptions, we prove in Appendix C that the outcome of the reduced form of n+1,k+1(s) is the same as the outcome
of the BRW game with y=F(n+1)−s, z= π̃n and t(w1)= tn+1,k(s+w1), where tn+1,k(s+w1) is a linear function of
w1 with derivative −βk . It then follows from Lemma 1 that, if F(n+1)−s−π̃n −w−tn+1,k(s+w)<0 or equivalently
F(n+1)−s−π̃n −(k+1)w<0, any SPE is such that the firm and the worker do not reach an agreement. In contrast, if
F(n+1)−s−π̃n −w−tn+1,k(s+w)≥0 or equivalently F(n+1)−s−π̃n −(k+1)w≥0, the unique SPE is such that firm








We can now summarize the characterization of the subgame n+1,k+1(s). If F(n+1)−s−π̃n −(k+1)w<0, any SPE
is such that the firm and the first worker do not reach an agreement. If F(n+1)−s−π̃n −(k+1)w≥0, any SPE is such that
the firm and the first worker immediately reach an agreement over the wage w1n+1,k+1(s) in (A6). Substituting tn+1,k(s+w)






















The sum tn+1,k+1(s) of the wage paid by the firm to the first worker, w1n+1,k+1(s), and the wages paid to the following k











These results establish that, if Proposition A.2 holds for some k ≤n, it also holds for k+1. Since the proposition holds
for k =1, this implies that it holds for any generic k ≤n+1. This completes the proof of Proposition A.2.
Letting k =n+1 and s=0 in Proposition A.2, we can characterize the payoffs of the subgame n+1,n+1(0). In
particular, if F(n+1)−π̃n −(n+1)w<0, any SPE is such that the firm does not reach an agreement with all of its n+1
workers. In this case, the payoff to the firm is given by π̃n+1 = π̃n. If F(n+1)−π̃n −(n+1)w≥0, the unique SPE is such
that the firm immediately reaches an agreement with all of its n+1 workers. In this case, the payoff to the firm is given by
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The above results show that, if Proposition A.1 holds for some n, it also holds for n+1. Since the proposition holds for
n=1, this means that it holds for any generic n=2,3... This completes the proof of Proposition A.1.
We are now in the position to prove Theorem A.1, which we restate for the reader’s convenience.
Theorem A.1. (Stole and Zwiebel game). Consider the SZ game n,n(0) between the firm and n workers. Assume that
the overall gains from trade are positive, i.e. F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0. In the limit for q→0, the unique SPE of the game is
such that the payoff π̃n to the firm is given by the difference equation




2j , for j=1,2,...n, (A12)






Proof. It is straightforward to show that if F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0 then F( j)−π̃j−1 −jw≥0 for j=1,2,...n−1. From this
observation and Proposition A.1, it follows that π̃j is given by (A1) for j=1,2,...n and w̃in is given by (A2) for i=1,2,...n.
Taking the limit of (A1) and (A2) for q→0, we obtain (A12) and (A13). ‖
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The following proposition contains the characterization of the unique no-delay SPE of the subgame n,n(0) in which the
firm has yet to reach an agreement with all of the n workers remaining in the game.
Proposition B.1. Consider the subgame n,n(0). (1) If F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw<0, any SPE is such that the firm does not
reach an agreement with all of the n workers. The payoff to the firm is given by π̃n = π̃n−1. (2) If F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0,
the unique no-delay SPE is such that the firm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the n workers. The payoff to
the firm is given by



















For n=1, Proposition B.1 holds as the payoffs in (B1) and (B2) boil down to the equilibrium payoffs of the BRW
game. For n=2, Proposition B.1 holds as the payoffs in (B1) and (B2) coincide with those derived in Section 3.2. In the
next pages, we are going to prove that Proposition B.1 holds for a generic n by induction. That is, we are going to prove
that if the proposition holds for the subgame n,n(0), it also holds for the subgame n+1,n+1(0) in which the firm has yet
to reach an agreement with all of the n+1 workers left in the game.
Central to the characterization of the subgame n+1,n+1(0) is the following proposition.
Proposition B.2. Consider the subgame n+1,k(s) in which the firm has n+1 workers, it has yet to reach an agreement
with k ≤n+1 workers, and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the other n+1−k workers. (i) If F(n+1)−
s−π̃n −kw<0, any SPE is such that the firm does not reach an agreement with all of the k remaining workers; (ii) If
F(n+1)−s−π̃n −kw≥0, the unique no-delay SPE is such that the firm reaches an immediate agreement with each of
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For k =1, Proposition B.2 holds as the payoffs in (B3)–(B5) are the same as in the BRW game. We prove that
Proposition B.2 holds for any k ≤n+1 by induction. That is, we prove that, if Proposition B.2 holds for some arbitrary
k ≤n, then it also holds for k+1. To this aim, we consider the subgame n+1,k+1(s), in which the firm has n+1 employees,
it has yet to reach an agreement with k+1 of them and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the other n−k. As
usual, we characterize the solution to this subgame by backward induction.
First, consider the subgame n,n(0) in which, after a breakdown in negotiations between the firm and the first of the
k+1 workers without agreement, bargaining starts over between the firm and the n workers left in the game. Since we
have conjectured that Proposition B.1 holds when the firm has n workers, the no-delay SPE payoff of the firm in this
subgame is uniquely determined and given by π̃n.
Second, consider the subgame n+1,k(s+w1) in which, after the firm has reached an agreement at some wage w1
with the first worker without an agreement, the firm starts bargaining with the other k workers without an agreement.
Since we conjectured that Proposition B.2 holds when the firm has n+1 workers and has yet to reach an agreement with
k of them, there is a unique no-delay SPE to this subgame. In particular, if w1 >w≡F(n+1)−s−π̃n −kw, any SPE is
such that the firm does not reach an agreement with all of the k remaining workers. In this case, the firm’s payoff is π̃n.
If w1 ≤w, the unique no-delay SPE is such that the firm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the k remaining
workers. In this case, the firm’s payoff is F(n+1)−s−w1 −tn+1,k(s+w1).
Third, we characterize the outcome of the subgame n+1,k+1(s). Assume that the gains from trade F(n+1)−s−
π̃n −(k+1)w are positive. Let mW and MW denote the infimum and the supremum among all no-delay SPE of the offer
made by a worker to the firm, given that there are k+1 workers without agreement. Similarly, let mF and MF denote
the infimum and the supremum among all no-delay SPE of the counteroffer made by the firm to a worker, given that
there are k+1 workers without agreement. A worker can always attain the payoff w by making offers greater than w and
rejecting all offers smaller than w. Since we are looking for SPEs in which all equilibrium offers and counteroffers are
immediately accepted, MW ≥mW ≥w and MF ≥mF ≥w. If the firm agrees with the worker to a wage w1 >w, the firm
enters the subgame n+1,k(s+w1) where it does not reach an agreement with all the other worker. Since we are looking
for no-delay SPE, mW ≤MW ≤w and mF ≤MF ≤w. Further, note that, if the firm and the worker reach an agreement at
any wage w1 ≤w, the firm enters the subgame n+1,k(s+w1) where it reaches an immediate agreement with all the other
workers.
Consider any no-delay SPE of n+1,k+1(s). First, we characterize the worker’s equilibrium payoffs from
accepting/rejecting a counteroffer ŵc ∈[w,w] from the firm, given that there are k+1 workers without agreement. If the
worker accepts the counteroffer, he attains a payoff of ŵc. In fact, if the worker accepts, the firm reaches an agreement with
all the other workers, the game comes to an end and the worker is paid the wage ŵc. If the worker rejects the counteroffer,
he attains a payoff between qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+MW ) and qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+mW ). In fact, if the worker rejects, he
exits the game with probability q. In this case, the worker attains a payoff of w. With probability 1−q, the worker moves to
the end of the queue. In this case, the firm and the worker agree to the wage wkn+1,k(s+wo) after the firm and the worker who
is first in the updated queue reach an agreement at some wage wo ∈[mW ,MW ]. Since wkn+1,k(s+wo) is strictly decreasing
in wo, the payoff to the worker from rejecting ŵc is between qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+MW ) and qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+mW ).
Second, we characterize the firm’s equilibrium counteroffer wc ∈[w,w]. The equilibrium counteroffer wc is accepted
by the worker. The worker’s decision can be optimal only if the payoff from accepting wc is greater than the payoff from
rejecting wc. Since the infimum of the firm’s counteroffer wc is mF , the worker’s acceptance payoff is wc, and the rejection
payoff is greater than qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+MW ), we have
mF ≥qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+MW ). (B6)
Similarly, note that, in equilibrium, the worker finds it optimal to accept any counteroffer ŵc ∈[w,w] greater than
qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+mW ). Thus, if the firm makes such a counteroffer, its payoff is F(n+1)−s−ŵc −tn+1,k(s+ŵc).
Since F(n+1)−s−ŵc −tn+1,k(s+ŵc) is strictly decreasing in ŵc, the firm’s equilibrium counteroffer wc can be optimal
only if it is no greater than qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+mW ). As the supremum of the firm’s counteroffer wc is MF , we have
MF ≤qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+mW ). (B7)
Third, we characterize the firm’s equilibrium payoff from acepting/rejecting an offer ŵo ∈[w,w] from a worker,
given that there are k+1 workers without agreement. If the firm accepts the offer, it attains a payoff of F(n+1)−s−
ŵo −tn+1,k(s+ŵo). If the firm rejects the offer, its payoff is between qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−MF −tn+1,k(s+MF )]
and qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−mF −tn+1,k(s+mF )]. In fact, if the firm rejects the offer, the worker exits the game with
probability q. In this case, the firm attains a payoff of π̃n. With probability 1−q, the firm makes a counteroffer. In this case,
the firm and the worker agree to some wage wc ∈[mF ,MF ] and then the firm and the other workers agree to wages summing
up to tn+1,k(s+wc). Since F(n+1)−s−wc −tn+1,k(s+wc) is strictly decreasing in wc, the firm’s payoff from rejecting
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Fourth, we characterize the worker’s equilibrium offer wo ∈[w,w]. The equilibrium offer wo is accepted by the firm.
The firm’s decision can be optimal only if the payoff from accepting wo is greater than the payoff from rejecting wo.
Since the supremum of the worker’s offer is MW , the firm’s acceptance payoff is F(n+1)−s−wo −tn+1,k(s+wo), and
the firm’s rejection payoff is greater than qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−MF −tn+1,k(s+MF )], we have
F(n+1)−s−MW −tn+1,k(s+MW )≥qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−MF −tn+1,k(s+MF )]. (B8)
Similarly, note that, in equilibrium, the firm accepts any offer ŵo ∈[w,w] such that the acceptance payoff is greater than
the upper bound qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−mF −tn+1,k(s+mF )] on the rejection payoff. Hence, if the worker makes
such an offer, he attains a payoff of ŵo. Since the firm’s acceptance payoff is strictly decreasing in ŵo, the worker’s
equilibrium offer wo can be optimal only if the firm’s acceptance payoff is no greater than the upper bound on the firm’s
rejection payoff. As the infimum of the worker’s offer wo is mW , we have
F(n+1)−s−mW −tn+1,k(s+mW )≥qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−mF −tn+1,k(s+mF )]. (B9)
Subtracting (B7) from (B6) and simplifying using (B5) gives mF −MF ≥γ (mW −MW ) with γ = (1−q)k/∑k
j=0(1−q)j . Subtracting (B9) from (B8) and simplifying using (B3) yields mW −MW ≥ (1−q)(mF −MF ). Combining
these inequalities gives mF −MF ≥ (1−q)γ (mF −MF ), and qγ <1 implies mF =MF =w∗c and mW =MW =w∗o . Thus









The above observations imply that, in any no-delay SPE, a worker makes the offer w∗o to the firm whenever there are
k+1 workers without agreement, and the firm makes the counteroffer w∗c to a worker whenever there are k+1 workers
without agreement.
We are now in the position to construct a candidate no-delay SPE of n+1,k+1(s). In the candidate SPE, a worker
makes the offer w∗o to the firm whenever there are k+1 workers without agreement. The firm accepts any offer ŵo such
that ŵo ≤w∗o and rejects any other offer. The firm makes the counteroffer w∗c to a worker whenever there are k+1 workers
without agreement. The worker accepts any counteroffer ŵc such that ŵc ≥w∗c and ŵc ≤w and rejects any offer ŵc <w∗c .
We do not need to specify the worker’s response to a counteroffer ŵc >w because, as we shall see, the firm never finds it
optimal to make such a counteroffer. Since any no-delay SPE is such that the worker makes the offer w∗o , the firm makes
the counteroffer w∗c and these proposals are accepted, the candidate no-delay SPE described above is unique with respect
to payoffs and outcomes.
First, we verify that the acceptance/rejection strategy of the worker is optimal. If the firm makes a counteroffer
ŵc ≤w, the worker’s acceptance payoff is ŵc and the rejection payoff is qw+(1−q)wkn+1,k(s+w∗o). By construction,
the acceptance payoff equals the rejection payoff for ŵc =w∗c and, hence, the worker finds it optimal to accept w∗c . The
acceptance payoff is strictly smaller than the rejection payoff for ŵc <w∗c and, hence, the worker finds it optimal to reject
ŵc. The acceptance payoff is strictly greater than the rejection payoff for ŵc >w∗c and, hence, the worker finds it optimal
to accept ŵc.
Second, we verify that the firm’s counteroffer w∗c is optimal. If the firm makes the counteroffer w∗c , the worker
accepts and the firm attains a payoff of F(n+1)−s−w∗c −tn+1,k(s+w∗c ). If the firm makes a counteroffer ŵc <w∗c , the
worker rejects and the firm’s payoff is qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−w∗o −tn+1,k(s+w∗o)], which is smaller than F(n+1)−
s−w∗c −tn+1,k(s+w∗c ) since w∗o >w∗c . If the firm makes a counteroffer ŵc >w∗c with ŵc ≤w, the worker accepts and the
firm’s payoff is F(n+1)−s−ŵc −tn+1,k(ŵc), which is smaller than F(n+1)−s−w∗c −tn+1,k(s+w∗c ). If the firm makes
a counteroffer ŵc >w and the worker accepts, the firm attains a payoff of π̃n. If the firm makes a counteroffer ŵc >w
and the worker rejects, the firm attains a payoff of qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−w∗o −tn+1,k(s+w∗o)]. In either case, the
firm’s payoff is smaller than F(n+1)−s−w∗c −tn+1,k(s+w∗c ). From the above observations, it follows that the firm finds
it optimal to make the counteroffer w∗c .
Third, we verify that the acceptance/rejection strategy of the firm is optimal. If the worker makes an offer ŵo ≤w,
the firm’s acceptance payoff is F(n+1)−s−ŵo −tn+1,k(s+ŵo) and the rejection payoff is qπ̃n +(1−q)[F(n+1)−s−
w∗c −tn+1,k(s+w∗c )]. By construction, the acceptance payoff equals the rejection payoff for ŵo =w∗o and, hence, the firm
finds it optimal to accept w∗o . The acceptance payoff is strictly greater than the rejection payoff for ŵo <w∗o and, hence,
the firm finds it optimal to accept ŵo <w∗o . The acceptance payoff is strictly smaller than the rejection payoff for ŵo >w∗o
and, hence, the firm finds it optimal to reject ŵo >w∗o . If the worker makes an offer ŵo >w, the firm’s acceptance payoff
is π̃n, which is strictly smaller than the rejection payoff. Hence, the firm rejects such an offer.
Finally, we verify that the worker’s offer w∗o is optimal. If the worker makes the offer w∗o , he attains a payoff of w∗o . If
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offer ŵo >w∗o , the firm rejects and the worker attains a payoff of qw+(1−q)w∗c , which is smaller than w∗o since w∗c <w∗o .
From the above observations, we conclude that the worker finds it optimal to make the offer w∗o .
We are now in the position to summarize our characterization of the SPE of the Rolodex game n+1,k+1(s). For
F(n+1)−s−π̃n −(k+1)w<0, it is straightforward to show that any SPE is such that the firm does not reach an agreement
with all the k+1 workers without agreement. For F(n+1)−s−π̃n −(k+1)w≥0, the unique no-delay SPE is such that
the firm reaches an immediate agreement with all of the k+1 workers who did not have an agreement at the beginning






















These observations show that, if Proposition B.2 holds for some k <n+1, it also holds for k+1. Since the proposition
holds for k =1, this means that it holds for any generic k. This concludes the proof of Proposition B.2.
Letting k =n+1 and s=0 in Proposition B.2, we can characterize the payoffs of the subgame n+1,n+1(0). In
particular, if F(n+1)−π̃n −(n+1)w≥0, the unique no-delay SPE is such that the firm immediately reaches an agreement
with all the n+1 workers. The payoff to the firm is given by



















The above results show that, if Proposition B.1 holds for some n, it also holds for n+1. Since the proposition holds for
n=1, this means that it holds for any generic n=2,3... This completes the proof of Proposition B.1.
We are now in the position to prove Theorem B.1, which we restate for the reader’s convenience.
Theorem B.1. (Rolodex game). Consider the Rolodex game n,n(0) between the firm and n workers. Assume that the
gains from trade are positive, i.e. F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0. In the limit for q→0, the unique no-delay SPE of the game is
such that the payoff to the firm is given by the difference equation
π̃j = π̃j−1 + [F( j)−π̃j−1 −jw]
/
(1+j), for j=1,2,...n, (B17)
with initial condition π̃0 =F(0). The payoff to the i-th of n workers is given by
w̃in =w+ [F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw]
/
(1+n). (B18)
Proof. It is straightforward to show that if F(n)−π̃n−1 −nw≥0 then F( j)−π̃j−1 −jw≥0 for j=1,2,...n−1. From this
observation and Proposition B.1, it follows that π̃j is given by (B1) for j=1,2,...n and w̃in is given by (B2) for i=1,2,...n.
Taking the limit of (B1) and (B2) for q→0, we obtain (B17) and (B18). ‖
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